

AFRICOM and ASF: Africa's Military, Strategic, and Economic Importance

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ABSTRACT

Since the birth of the idea of AFRICOM in early 2007, Africa's reaction to AFRICOM was largely negative; there was variation in types of responses. Some leaders in sub-regions and states feared terrorist attacks against an AFRICOM bas that would undermine their regimes. Others feared the possibility of a regime change. Sub-regional powers objected to U.S. military presence in their area of hegemonic control. The non-aligned states rejected AFRICOM while more liberal and Pro-Western states accepted it. This paper attempts to discuss the plethora of issues regarding the convergent and divergent views surrounding president George W. Bush intentions to establish U.S. AFRICOM on African continent. The paper is of the view that despite U.S. denial of China's rising influence in the continent, the U.S. is at the center of AFRICOM for a purpose, particularly to contain Chinese influence. This paper adopts descriptive and analytical method of historical research. The paper argues that any partnership from any quarters on security in Africa should be border on military intelligence, high tech weapons and technological development to the African Union with mission scenarios to address African security concerns. The paper further suggests that any collaboration or partnership entered by African states should be without strings or disregard to African states sovereignty.

Keywords: AFRICOM, ASF, Africa, Military.

Introduction

I am pleased to announce my decision to create a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa. I have directed the Secretary of Defense to stand up U.S. Africa Command by the end of fiscal year 2008. This new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa.¹

President George W. Bush announced the formation of the U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM, on February 6, 2007, and the new Unified Combatant Command (UCC) became operational on October 1, 2008. This made AFRICOM officially operational as the United States' newest combatant command, with its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. Before the establishment of AFRICOM, the U.S. conducted its military relations with Africa through three different commands namely: the European Command, which had responsibility for most of the continent; the Central Command, which oversaw Egypt and the Horn of Africa region along with the Middle East and Central Asia; and the Pacific Command, which administered military ties with Madagascar and other islands in the Indian Ocean. This unveiled Africa's growing military, strategic, and economic importance on the global scene.

The Bush administration more than quadrupled the aid sent to Africa. It launched a number of programmes to help Africa, including the Millennium Challenge Account, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the Africa Education Initiative, the President's Malaria Initiative, the Congo Basin Forest Partnership, and the Initiative to End Hunger in Africa.² This was apart from AFRICOM which the administration argued it was only adopting a new interagency style to reflect the range of issues it faces from terrorism to AIDS. While public opinion tilt towards oil in the Gulf of Guinea and the rising influence of China as reasons for AFRICOM, the U.S. vehemently denied such claims.

This is because global consumption of oil is running at about 84 million barrels per day (mbpd) and growing at over 2 per cent per annum. The U.S. tops the chart at over 21 mbpd, with an average person using 7,500 gallons of oil per year while in China an average person uses just 800 gallons per year.³ This is apart from the very many industries and factories and other forms of production that rely on oil to run. Even though the idea of a U.S.- AFRICOM seems to take the back seat, debate and literature on peace and security of Africa viz a viz U.S. and other external influences from developed countries concerning security and economy is increasing. The focus of the paper therefore, is to examine and analyze factors such as the attraction of the Gulf of Guinea, rising influence of China as ostensible reasons behind the U.S. attempt to establish an Africa Command on the African continent; the sudden geo- strategic role Africa assumed in world politics, particularly U.S. foreign policy after terror attacks on the U.S. in 2001; Africa's resistance to AFRICOM and preference to support to Africa Standby Force; and the future of Africa Standby Force and AFRICOM under the Obama administration.

Africa's Resistance to AFRICOM The decision of the United States met skepticism, suspicion and even stiff resistance from Africa. First, there was the media reaction. A media organization in Johannesburg, argued that: "The expansion of an American strategic geopolitical military base on the continent will worsen many of the problems Africa has at present."⁴ Citing the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan as examples, an Algerian based media outfit said: "The African countries should wake up after seeing the scars of other countries experiences."⁵ Also, a Nigerian journalist, lamented that: "Increased U.S. military presence in Africa may simply serve to protect

unpopular regimes that are friendly to its interests, as was the case during the Cold War, while Africa slips further into poverty.”⁶ The African blogosphere also reacted quite negatively, seeing AFRICOM as a springboard for further U.S. exploitation of the continent and interference in their domestic affairs.

Secondly, at the official level, only smaller African countries such as Liberia showed any enthusiasm for the AFRICOM project.⁷ This could be explained, partly, in terms of their belief in the U.S. ability to serve as an effective counterweight to the local regional hegemonies. Other than that, many African officials expressed their pessimism and suspicion. For instance, the Libyan ambassador to South Africa, Abdullahi Alzubedi, queried, saying: How can the U.S. divide the world up into its own military commands? Wasn't that for the United Nations to do? What would happen if China also decided to create its Africa command? Would this not lead to conflict on the continent?⁸

Nigeria's president Musa Yar'Adua told the council of state meeting on November 19, 2007 most African leaders were opposed to the idea of AFRICOM and so was Nigeria.⁹ Many African states rather, opted for support for the strengthening of Africa Standby Force, which the Africa Union established in 2003 and stated that:

In order to enable the Peace and Security Council [to] perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and interventions ... an African Standby Force shall be established. Such Force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.¹⁰

The U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in what appeared a confession, said: “I think that, in a certain sense, we probably did not do the work necessary to win support for AFRICOM.”¹¹

This seeming skepticism and resistance to AFRICOM by Africans and Africa could be understood from a number of reasons based on Africa experience with the outside world. Africa and Africans, perhaps more than any other continent, has a history of been beset by external forces from the outside world in general and by the reigning ‘great powers’ in particular. For instance, Africa, before it could recover from the harrowing experience of the Trans- Atlantic Slave Trade, was again put under the yoke of colonialism. The fading away of the colonial era did not, also, end outside interference in African affairs. Neo colonialism set the machinery on ground for Western interests to further exploit the human and natural resources of the continent. In fact, Africa also became a proxy battleground for many engagements of the so-called Cold War.

Most of the countries that host any American military base have their citizens resenting their addiction for sex, abuses and other crimes by U.S. service men.¹² For instance, public opinion in South Korea is divided between those who think the U.S. is their savior, using their bases there to deter invasion from Communist North, and those who blame the U.S. for the Korean Peninsula's very division.¹³ Arabs in many countries

in the Middle East think the U.S. rides roughshod over their interest, cares little for their fate, and supports corrupt regimes that rule over them. Most crucially, they believe that the U.S.' backing for what they see as the brutal Israeli regime that occupies Palestine means that the U.S. has a double standard.¹⁴ Therefore, AFRICOM's mission is a suspect and can be qualified with a one sided aim favoring the US only and not Africa or the Gulf of Guinea countries nor Nigeria. Nigeria being one of the dominant nations in the region would face most of the negative implications of having the AFRICOM in the region.

The only change Africa has experienced is, perhaps, the growing number of super powers on the list of those with 'interests' in the continent. While traditional players like France and Britain still appear on the list, their traditional position in Africa is now being challenged by the U.S., China, India and even Brazil. The growing role of these powers is simply an inevitable product of globalization; that unstoppable process that is ensuring that Africa is now inextricably a player at a disadvantaged position in the global process. This, in a sense, is the 'new scramble' for Africa's natural resources, and these new 'interveners' are Africa's new colonizers.

The Military, Strategic, and Economic Importance of Africa in a Globalizing World Any attempt of discourse or understanding of AFRICOM from the prism of geopolitics should take cognizance of the principle of 'Carter Doctrine'. In this wise, the creation of AFRICOM should be seen to represent the globalization of the Doctrine; the pledge made by President Carter in his final State of the Union Address in 1980 that the United States would use all necessary means "including the use of military force"¹⁵ to ensure the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. This pledge has now been extended to the entire world, driving the growing U.S. military presence not only in Africa, but in South America, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia as well.

It is important to recognize that the United States is not the only country that is responsible for the militarization of African oil production and that China, India, Russia, and other countries are also playing significant roles. Since the late 1990s, Africa has become an increasingly important source of American oil imports. World oil production has peaked and, as production from older fields declines, there are only two parts of the world where significant new fields will come into production over the next 10-15 years: Central Asia and Africa. Africa now supplies more oil to the United States than the Middle East; it currently provides some 15-20% of total U.S. oil imports and is expected to provide at least 25% by 2015. In 2002, the Bush administration declared that access to Africa's oil supplies would henceforth be defined as a "strategic national interest" of the United States.¹⁶ As a result, Africa's status in U.S. national security policy and military affairs rose dramatically. Against this background, let us then attempt to analyze two main factors namely, oil in the Gulf of Guinea and the rising influence of China that could possibly have led the U.S. to attempt establishing a military base in Africa.

The Gulf of Guinea is a geographical coastline that stretches from Angola through Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon to Nigeria. This zone has not always ranked high either in global energy calculations or in the foreign policy agenda of Western or developed countries. However, the situation appears to be changing, as more oil is

discovered in the region, and as tension and political instability grip major world suppliers in the Persian Gulf. Middle East oil producers currently account for about 25 percent of all United States oil imports, while Gulf of Guinea suppliers, mainly Angola and Nigeria, account for about 15 per cent. With this new economic interest in the Gulf of Guinea, American energy analysts estimate that West Africa's share of the market may reach 25 per cent by 2015 as other countries in the region, including Gabon, Congo, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome & Principe boost their production output as well.¹⁷

The renewed interest in the Gulf of Guinea assumed an international dimension in the wake of the terrorist's attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001 known as 9/11. This became a major turning point in the U.S. foreign policy.¹⁸ In the space of a very short time that followed, the U.S. in its relationship with Africa moved swiftly from post-Cold War cynical neglect to post-9/11 active interest and engagement.¹⁹ At the initial stage, it was difficult to know exactly how long this active engagement with Africa was going to last. At a symposium held in 2002 in Washington D.C. key stakeholders like the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (consisting of top US government officials, legislators, and oil merchants) recommended that, African oil be treated as a priority for the national security of the US after the 9/11 attack and that the U.S. government should declare the Gulf of Guinea as an area of vital interest.²⁰ It was at this point that the experts further recommended that American warships commence patrol around the Gulf of Guinea, especially the West African coast.²¹

This strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea is best described in the words of Sir Walter Raleigh who said: "whoever commands the sea commands the trade; whoever commands the trade commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself".²² It is worthy of note that the geo- strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea can be attributed to the contemporary security and political situation in other parts of the world where oil and gas are being exploited and produced. Dieterich observes that although the entire African proven oil reserve, which is estimated at 80 billion barrels, constitutes seven percent of the total global reserves the quality of African oil is rated excellent.

Another importance of the Gulf of Guinea region is the distance between the US and Africa. Transporting the oil to the U.S. is easier, safer and cheaper compared to the Middle East. So also is safeguarding the oil field and keeping surveillance over them. More so, African oil, especially in the Gulf of Guinea, will be extracted from open sea platforms that are away from the dire and often troubled mainland of the respective states.²³ Most of the Middle East's oil today is shipped eastwards towards India, Japan, Korea and China, who are less likely to be prime targets in a dispute with Middle Eastern countries. The Gulf of Guinea location is also a vital alternative for source of crude oil to the US as any serious upheaval in the Middle East always runs the risk of disrupting oil flow, thereby causing oil prices to soar.

It is well known that the industrialized countries like the US, China, India and multinational corporations the world over, need oil to sustain their domestic energy. The

situation has gotten to the level that oil has become a national security matter without which the U.S. and China can easily plunge into self-consuming crisis. For this reason, the super powers navigate everywhere in search, acquisition and protection of oil and gas sources. In the process, countries and companies deploy their political, military and economic resources to achieve their goals in a manner devoid of due process. This unwholesome type of approach has now given a picture of a looming 'Cold War' in the Gulf of Guinea as a new scramble for Africa.²⁴

The U.S. is not the only developed economy seeking for African oil and influence. China has, over time, wielded some level of control and influence on most African nations. And the increasing influence of China provides African nations with an alternative that, at least in the near term, is in many ways much more appealing. For instance, most African nations would rather do business with China, owing to the fact that China would not dabble in to their political leadership as the U.S. This Chinese influence on Africa is definitely a source of worry to the U.S. and has tremendous importance for U.S.- Africa policy. The African continent has become one of the key battlegrounds of the upcoming "Cold War" between the United States and China. Therefore, a U.S. military base is strategic in wading off China and gaining a military hold on Africa, especially the Gulf of Guinea.

Russia, too, might become a player in the fight over the resources of Africa. Gazprom, a Russian gas firm, at a point was competing to take over gas fields abandoned by Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria.²⁵ It was at this time also that several Chinese firms were expressing interest in fields in Ogoni land that contain gas reserves estimated at 10 trillion cubic meters. Although the U.S. has continued to deny that AFRICOM has nothing to do with China not many accept their defence. Theresa Whelan, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, testified in August 2007 that unlike a traditional Unified Command, AFRICOM will focus on building African regional security and crisis response capacity and will promote greater security ties between the United States and Africa, providing new opportunities to enhance bilateral military relationships, and strengthen the capacities of Africa's regional and sub-regional organizations. U.S. military engagement in Africa would remain primarily focused on building partnership capacities, conducting theater security cooperation, building important counter-terrorism skills and, as appropriate, supporting U.S. Government agencies in implementing other programs that promote regional stability.²⁶ She emphasized that AFRICOM was not formed "solely to fight terrorism, or to secure oil resources, or to discourage China."²⁷

In June 2008, the assistant secretary of defense for Africa policy was again, confronted with the issue of AFRICOM in relation to China and asked why China was missing from her briefing. She said:

It was missing for a reason, because this isn't about China. Everybody seems to want it to be about China and maybe that is a little nostalgia for the Cold War, I don't know. But it isn't about China. It is about U.S. security interests in Africa in the context of

global security. China, yes, has become more engaged in Africa, both—primarily for economic reasons. They have interests in African natural resources and extracting those resources. They also have interests in African markets. That's fine. The United States isn't concerned with Chinese economic competition. I mean, we're a capitalist nation. We're built on the principle of competition. So that is not really an issue for us.²⁸

Based on these postulations and evidence, it is convenient to argue that AFRICOM was oriented toward China, terrorism, and oil, albeit indirectly. Although designed to foster African security in a way congenial to U.S. interests, it was also meant to counter Chinese influence that would adversely affect the favorable environment the United States seeks to foster.

African Standby Force, Terrorism and International Support

In order to enable the Peace and Security Council to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and interventions ... an African Standby Force shall be established. Such Force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.²⁹

African Standby Force was birthed in May 2003 when the African Chiefs of Defence and Security (ACDS) adopted a document entitled: The policy framework document on the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and of the Military Staff Committee (MSC). During a meeting a few days later, African ministers of foreign affairs recommended regular consultations to consolidate the proposals contained in the framework document. Africa Union heads of state and government endorsed this recommendation during their summit meeting two months later and, after two key meetings of the ACDS in May 2003 and January 2004, adopted an amended framework document in July 2004. Originally, the purpose of the standby force was largely 'never to allow another genocide like Rwanda', which was the rationale behind the need for quick response capabilities and the capability to mount a mission to cover the early days while the ponderous UN peacekeeping system lumbered into operational mode.³⁰

The Africa Union had agreed that the ASF be established in two phases: the time frame for the implementation of phase one was from 2004 to 30 June 2006. The AU's key objective during this period was to establish a strategic level management capacity, while the regions would complement the AU by establishing forces up to brigade level strength. The priority here was the military and police aspects of the standby force, since it was deemed that United Nations humanitarian, development and human rights elements, which do not require a UN Security Council mandate, would be able to deploy in tandem with standby force missions.

The time frame for the implementation of phase two was to end on June 30, 2010. It was envisaged that the AU must have developed full mission scenario 5 and 6 capacities within the period.³¹ It was accepted that in the case of an outbreak of crisis/conflict, the AU will deploy first, opening up the possibility for a UN follow-on multidimensional peace support operation. In this scenario standby forces will therefore, be deployed into a situation as part of the peace-making process at an earlier stage than UN forces would be allowed to engage. They would then help to create the conditions on the ground that could lead to a comprehensive peace agreement and the deployment of UN forces. This was indeed the situation in Burundi with the AU and UN, and with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the UN in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. The exit strategy for ASF operations is therefore a transition to the UN –which could include the re-designation of substantial ASF resources as UN contingents.

The Africa Standby Force, though a lofty idea, at the time of writing this paper have not been able to overcome its seeming financial and other challenges to make it efficiently functional. It would also appear that the fight against terror does not assume a front burner of securities issues the standby force was established to address, yet terrorism is about the greatest challenge confronting the Africa continent at present. Funding options opened to the AU range from the unlikely scenario of AU missions funded by means of assessed UN contributions to 'burden sharing' in which specific countries provide dedicated support to African partners, and included a range of intermediate options.³²

The AU has come around to the view that relying on external partners alone is not a feasible option. Accordingly, the commission now emphasizes the need for greater efficiency of programme budgeting, effective allocation of current externally generated resources and mobilization of additional resources from within Africa.³³ What is unclear is the extent to which African troop contributors share that view, since they, and not the commission of the AU, are the ones who would have to cough up the money.³⁴ In other words, demand for international peace operations remains high while the willingness of the international community to intervene is declining and defence budgets continue to shrink: a challenge which the standby force is yet to decipher how to deal with.

Apart from funding, another challenge of Africa Standby Force is how to deal with terrorists' organizations on the continent. Global jihadist terrorist organizations—the universe of groups comprised of Al Qaeda and those affiliated with or inspired by it—have been active in Africa. Osama bin Laden lived in Sudan between 1992 and 1996, and it was there that Al Qaeda was born as a terrorist organization. Al Qaeda's first major terrorist operation was the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dares Salaam in 1998. Al Qaeda struck again in Kenya in 2002, bombing a discotheque and attempting to shoot down an Israeli airliner.³⁵

Since then more groups springing up with very daring attacks. There is the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat which announced its alliance with Al Qaeda and renamed as "Al Qaeda in the Maghreb" in September 2006, and the "Libyan

Islamic Fighting Group” apparently which also, pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda in November 2007. The U.S. State Department asserted that the Council of Islamic Clerics (CIC, also known as the Islamic Courts Union) that came to power in Somalia in 2006 was “hijacked by al Shabaab (The Youth), another extremist group affiliated with [Al Qaeda].”³⁶ Somalia provided a sanctuary for several Al Qaeda operatives and affiliates until late in 2006, when Ethiopia invaded and subsequently drove the CIC from power. In South Africa, there is the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), a Muslim radical group suspected of terrorist links and attacks.³⁷

Even without AFRICOM, the U.S. has conducted a number of counter-terrorism combat operations in Africa. It fired cruise missiles at Sudan in 1998 in retaliation for the embassy bombings. Concerned that remnant of Al Qaeda would flee to East Africa after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. formed naval Task Force 150 in early 2002 to patrol the region's coast. The United States also supported the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia that drove the CIC from power, and it used aircraft twice and cruise missiles once to attack groups of global jihadist in Somalia in 2007.³⁸ The U.S. also gave assistance in Mali against jihadists' elements there and have promised assistance to help Nigeria combat the dreaded Boko Haram. Unfortunately, the U.S expenditures remain relatively small in a region they claim to want to help. For instance, security assistance to African countries totaled less than \$250 million in 2006, the cost of hours of operations in Iraq in that same period.³⁹

There are the extremist Boko Haram insurgents in the north east that is growing stronger and other local terrorist organizations, exemplified by Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in Nigeria, and other insurgencies competing with state authority through large areas of Sub-Saharan Africa. A look at these fundamentalist terror organizations against the backdrop of a critical examination of the A.U. Peace and Security Council Protocol and Africa Standby Force and its six mission scenarios indicates a challenge for African leaders to combat terrorists ‘forces using the standby force. As it is, the standby force troops are unlikely to add much value to the ability of Algeria, say, to defeat terrorists in that region. They are also unlikely to stop extremists in the Maghreb from committing terrorist attacks in that area and even launch attacks in faraway Europe. The standby force cannot control the ungoverned spaces of the Sahel, bring peace to West Africa, or defeat MEND or other similar groups in the Niger Delta.

It was in recognition of impediments against the successful implementation of the mission scenarios of the Africa Standby Force that Nigeria's late president Musa Yar Adua and some African leaders argued that instead of setting up U.S- AFRICOM on the continent, the U.S. should rather give unconditional support to Africa Standby Force.⁴⁰ Against this backdrop, what other options, apart from AFRICOM, are on the table for the U.S in partnering with Africa in the area of support for peace and security? Can the U.S. be willing to support Africa Standby Force unconditionally? Is China's rising influence in Africa really a threat to the U.S? If the answer is yes, how then can or should the U.S. respond?

The Future of African Standby Force and AFRICOM under the Obama Administration

Since 2008, a plethora of literature has continued to be churned out on AFRICOM. Even though the idea seems to have been laid to rest by the Obama administration; that has not stopped the flow of essays or debate on the subject matter. Arguments in favour of AFRICOM emphasize that the new strategic interest in Africa is mutually beneficial to Africa and the United States since the U.S. will be collaborating with African states to curtail instability and secure peace—the conditions necessary to maximize democracy and minimize the potential for terrorism. Those who oppose AFRICOM argue that to a very large extent, United States military policies do not measure up to Africa's needs and could in all likelihood amount to U.S. imperialistic control over Africa and its people. In addition, opponents say the U.S. is attempting to counter Chinese influence on the continent and secure African oil supplies which will account for 25% of its energy demands by 2015. In a more realistic manner, most African leaders see AFRICOM as nothing more than a mechanism of war, a kinder, gentler military intrusion designed to appear less combative than other military operations on the African continent such as: Operation Enduring Freedom –Trans-Sahara and the Combined Joint Task Force –Horn of Africa which are connected to the Global War on Terrorism. The fact that AFRICOM is integrating its aims through the U.S. State Department and USAID does not camouflage its primary militaristic thrust; and it is for that reason that no amount of positive “Public Relation” will convince African leaders otherwise.⁴¹

No matter the convergence or divergence of views on AFRICOM, African leaders and states are not viewed as actors and sovereign equals on the world stage of international economic and security cooperation. The U. S. continues to regard Africa as a regional backwater on the periphery of its central concerns and in spite of efforts such as the Millennium Challenge Account, HIV/AIDS, Malaria intervention and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the attitude toward Africa remains basically condescending and patronizing. The approach to Africa is oriented toward crisis intervention and preemptive policies that view Africa as an empty theater by which the major players compete for high stakes—in other words Africa functions as a backdrop for the U.S. to neutralize its enemies such as communists during the Cold War era and the terrorists of today. If AFRICOM is about mutual cooperation, it must raise a fundamental question in formulating policy: in what way(s) can you say that African interests are at the center of AFRICOM'S aims? What are the tangible and intangible benefits of stationing U.S. troops on African soil?

No doubt, Africa is strategic to United States interest. However, what Africans want is to engage the U.S. in equal trade and respect for her sovereignty. If this cannot be achieved due to the U.S. continued myopic vision concerning Africa, then the former may risk the chance of engaging Africa unilaterally, and increasing China's and other emerging powers continuing influence on the continent. Also, If the U.S. wants to compete peacefully in Africa, then it should acknowledge that its interests in Africa is not

about benevolence or altruism, and should openly recognize that China's influence in Africa is only a part of a new emerging world order that has peacefully replaced it and Europe as traditional major players in global trade as indicted by Fareed Zakaria in his book.⁴² African leaders on their part should ensure that none of these new global players uses the military to advance their interests in Africa. Should the Obama administration or the U.S. government in future consider revamping AFRICOM, it should take steps towards demilitarizing AFRICOM, and rather, partner/support, unconditionally, the African Standby Force in achieving the force's mission scenarios and other A.U. security and defense concerns. The U.S. should also explore ways through which it could support Africa to defend itself against political instability, terrorism, piracy and other volatile situations through the supply of intellectual and technological capacities and increase the Millennium Account's and USAID budget and invest more in African physical and technological infrastructure.

Conclusion

This paper has made attempts at discussing the plethora of essays as well as the convergent and divergent views surrounding President George W. Bush intentions to establish U.S-AFRICOM on African continent. The paper is of the view that although the U.S. has continued to deny, oil and China's rising influence in Africa were at the center of the U.S-AFRICOM, and conclude that any partnership from any quarters on security in Africa should border on military intelligence, high tech weapons and technological development to the African Standby Force which was set up by the Africa Union with mission scenarios to address African security concerns. Special attention should be on bringing peace and security to the people of Africa and promoting common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth on the continent without necessarily stationing troops on the continent. Also, any collaboration or partnership should be without strings or disregard to African states sovereignty. This is because African leaders and states are actors and sovereign equals on the world stage of international economic and security cooperation.

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25. C. Amanze-Nwachuku and D. Iriekpen, "Nigeria: Russian, Chinese Oil Firms Jostle for Ogoni," *This Day* Lagos, 16 June 2008, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200806160005.html>. See also, M. Diop Mboup et al, *Misguided Intentions: Resisting AFRICOM*, Military Review, July- August, 2009, p.88.
26. A Statement by Theresa M. Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa, Office of the Secretary of Defense, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, August 2, 2007, at foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/37068.pdf.
27. Ibid.
28. "Pentagon Africa Policy Chief Whelan Describes U.S. Objectives for Africa Command," Transcript, 18 February 2008, Accessed August 22, 2014.
29. Peace and Security Council Protocol, Article 13.1. Also, the Peace and Security Council's objectives, which should guide the strategy and employment of the ASF, are to: Promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development; Anticipate and prevent conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, the PSC shall have the responsibility to undertake peace- making and peace building functions

for the resolution of these conflicts; Promote and implement peace building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence; Co-ordinate and harmonise continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects; Develop a common defence policy for the Union, in accordance with article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act; Promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts. The AUC's Peace and Security Directorate (PSD) is the primary action arm of the Council. It plans and coordinates peace operations in Africa. In order to create the ASF, the AU developed a roadmap in March 2005, which envisions developing the ASF in two phases (AU 2005).

30. J. Cilliers, "The African Standby Force: An update on progress", Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies Paper 160, March 2008, p.1.

31. Mission Scenarios for the African Standby Force: Scenario 1: Regional military advice to a political mission (e.g., Cote d'Ivoire). Scenario 2: AU regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN Mission (e.g., OAU/AU liaison mission in the border area between Ethiopia and Eritrea (OLMEE) or the Verification Monitoring Team (VMT) in Sudan). Scenario 3: Stand-alone observer mission (e.g., AU missions in Burundi (AMIB) or the AU Mission in the Comoros (AMIC)). Scenario 4: Stand-alone peacekeeping mission under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and preventive deployment of troops for peace enforcement (e.g., AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB)). Scenario 5: Peacekeeping mission in accordance with a complex, multidimensional peacekeeping mission. Scenario 6: (Military) intervention of the AU in grave emergencies, e.g. for prevention of genocide, when the international community fails to intervene. (African Union: Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force) See also, J. Cilliers, "The African Standby Force"...

32. J. Cilliers and M. Malan, Progress with the African Standby Force, ISS Paper no 107, May, Pretoria. Available at www.issafrica.org, 2005 listed seven options for external support to African peace-keeping missions. Accessed August 22, 2014.

33. Background and concept paper (par 35) for the brainstorming retreat between the AU and the regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, at Algiers, Algeria on 5 and 6 January 2008. J. Cilliers, The African Standby Force..., p.20.

34. Five per cent of AU members' contributions go to the peace fund, which would have totalled \$4 350 000 in 2007 if all members had paid their contributions (26 out of 53 have not). See J. Cilliers, The African Standby Force..., p.20.

35. C. Davis, "AFRICOM's Relationship to Oil, Terrorism and China", Foreign Policy Research Institute, Pennsylvania: Elsevier Limited, 2008, pp.125-127.

36. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports: Africa Overview,” Country Reports on Terrorism, April 30, 2007, at www.state.gov/s/cr/rls/crt/2006/82730.htm. See also International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2007, New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 36.
37. For more on some of the terror organizations operating in Africa see, A. Rabasa, P. Chalk, K. Cragin, et al., Beyond al-Qaeda, Part I: The Global Jihadist Movement, Santa Monica: RAND, 2006, p. 132; K. J. Menkhaus, “Somalia and Somaliland” in R. I. Rotberg, (ed.), Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, Washington, DC: Brookings, 2005.
38. J. Gettleman, “U.S. Strikes Inside Somalia, Bombing Suspected Militant Hide-Out,” New York Times, June 3, 2007, p. 20.
39. J. J. Kruzell, “Pentagon Official Describes AFRICOM’s Mission, Dispels Misconceptions,” American Forces Press Service, at www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1477 Accessed August 22, 2014.
40. See O. Adeniyi, Power, Politics and Death..., p.134.
41. J. Issa and S. Faraji, The Obama Administration: Revisiting and Reconsidering AFRICOM, The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.2, no.9, March 2009.
42. Fareed Zakaria describes with equal prescience a world in which the United States will no longer dominate the global economy, orchestrate geopolitics, or overwhelm cultures. He sees the ‘rise of the rest’—the growth of countries like China, India, Brazil, Russia, and many others—as the great story of our time, and one that will reshape the world. The tallest buildings, biggest dams, largest-selling movies, and most advanced cell phones are all being built outside the United States. This economic growth is producing political confidence, national pride, and potentially international problems. For details see, F. Zakaria, The Post-American World, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008.